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The Ethics of Implementation: Institutional
Remedies and the Lawyer's Role
SUSAN POSER*

"A right is not a right, unless it can be enforced; a remedy is not a remedy, if it
is available only in theory." 1

The issue addressed in this Article is whether and to what extent a lawyer has
an ethical responsibility to pursue implementation of the remedy in institutional
reform litigation. Institutional reform litigation refers to cases in which an
individual or class of individuals sues a large organization in order to vindicate
constitutional or statutory rights.z The types of cases with which this Article is
concerned are the "public law,,3 type, such as school desegregation, prisoners'
rights and patients' rights cases, although included under the rubric of institutional reform can be, inter alia, antitrust, reapportionment and bankruptcy cases. 4
1 am interested in the former types of cases because of the nature of the individual
rights at stake and the fact that the demand for plaintiffs' attorneys in these cases
far outweighs the supply, which is part of the context in which the ethical
dilemma discussed in this Article arises. The implementation stage of institutional reform litigation arises after an individual or class of individuals prevails at
the liability stage, or pursuant to a settlement, and a court orders the defendant
organization to change in order to vindicate the plaintiffs' rights. At that point, the
defendant organization, whether it be a prison, mental hospital or school district,
usually has the burden of implementing the order. What is the plaintiffs' lawyer's
responsibility in monitoring and pressing for implementation?5 Can she fairly

* Visiting Assistanl Professor, Universily of Nebraska College of Law. B.A. 1985, Swarthmore College; J.O.
1991, Boalt Hall School of Law, Universily of California, Berkeley; A.B.D. Jurisprudence & Social Policy
Program, University ofCalifomia, Berkeley. 1 would like to thank Stephen McG. Bundy, Christine K. Abraham,
and members of the University of Nebraska College of Law Faculty Colloquium.
1. STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR i (1986) [hereinafler STANDARDS FOR
PROVIDERS OF LEGAL SERVICES].
2. See Abram Chayes, Foreword: The Roie of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281,
1284 (1976) (Iabeling this public law litigation); see aiso Owen Fiss, Foreword: The 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 1,2 (1979) (Iabeling il struclural reform litigation).
3. See Chayes, supra noIe 2, al 1284 (describing the characteristic features ofthis Iype oflitigation).
4. Id. See a/so David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-Appoinred Masters, Schooi
Desegregation, and Institutionai Reform, 32 ALA. L. REv. 313, 315-16 (1981) (listing the types ofsuits thal fall
under the instilutional reform heading).
5. This article will nol address the duties of the defendanl's lawyer, although there are importanl issues aboul
the ethical responsibilily of the defendanl's lawyer who may be encouraged 10 resisl implementation. See Paul
L. Traclenberg, The View from the Bar: An Examination of the Litigator s Roie in Shaping Educationai
Remedies, in JUSTICE AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN EDUCATION LITIGATION 390, 401
115
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ignore the case and move on to the next case while remaining willing and able to
renew litigation and move for contempt if the defendants fail to comply?6 Or does
the lawyer have a dutY to continue her advocacy on behalf of her client to the
same extent (although perhaps in a different form) as she had during the liability
stage, even if that means tuming away new clients? Or, is her role somewhere in
between?
Although much attention has been paid to the role of plaintiffs' lawyers during
the liability stage of this type of litigation,7 during settlement negotiations,8 and
at the time the remedy is chosen,9 there is virtually no scholarly literature on the
professional responsibility of lawyers in the implementation stage of institutional
reform litigation. With one exception, 10 there currently exist no specifie mIes or
literature to which a lawyer in this situation can tum for guidance, and neither the
scholarly literature on professional responsibility nor on institutional reform
litigation acknowledges this as an ethical problem. An examination of case law
and case studies, however, reveals its shadowy existence.
For example, in the celebrated Willowbrook case, Il as told by David and
Sheila Rothman,12 five years after the consent judgment had been signed, which
required the community placement of thousands of mentally retarded residents
who were at the time residing at the Willowbrook State School, the authors
(Barbara Flicker ed., 1990) (discussing the role of defendants' attorneys in institutional refonn Iitigation and
their ethical obligations in the compliance phase).
6. Courts retain jurisdiction throughout the implementation stage of institutional refonn Iitigation. Special
Project: The Remediai Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 784, 816-17 (1978)
[hereinafter Special Project]. New claims that arise after the liability stage of a case but relate to the subject
matter of the class action, and the remedial decree must he made through the class counsel. Gillespie v.
Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1102-03 (5th Ciro 1988). Counsel has a dutYto look into such claims and to "exercise
bis independent judgment to determine whether a motion to enforce the consent decree should he filed." McNeil
v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1166 (lOth Ciro 1991). Thus, class counsel rernains an integral part of the remedial
process.
7. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); William H.Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 1090-1114 (1988) (arguing that the plaintiffs' lawyer should
exercise sorne degree of discretion when deciding which parties to represent and how to represent them, within
the context of the liability phase); Andreas Eschete, Does a Lawyer's Character Matter?, in THE GOOD LAWYER
270, 280-83 (David Luban 00., 1983) (discussing the adversarial role of the lawyer in institutional refonn
litigation).
8. See, e.g., Mary K. Kane, OfCarrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role ofthe Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEx.
L. REv. 385, 395-6 (1987) (identifying several potential conflicts of interest for the plaintiffs' attorney in
settlement negotiations).
9. For a discussion of intra-class conflicts that arise when plaintiffs mUSI detennine the type of remedy they
are seeking, see generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L. J. 470 (1976) (discussing conflicts within the plaintiff class in
school desegregation litigation) and Deborah L. Rhode, Class Confiicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183
(1982) (suggesting procedural refonns that could ameliorate intra-class conflict).
10. See infra notes 192-193, and accompanying text (discussing the STANDARDS FOR PROVIDERS OF LEGAL
SERVICES).
II. New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 V.S. 915
(1983).
12. DAVID 1. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS (1984).
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recount a confrontation between members of the class of parents of children at
Willowbrook and their lawyers who were pressing for a settlement involving a
modification of the consent decree. At a meeting, one of the parents accused the
lawyers of being "gutless and ignorant, negotiating with the state when they
should have been suing it for contempt. Either because of inexperience or in a
rush to get back to their private clients, they were selling out the class." 13
Another writer, recounting the ongoing litigation over the San Francisco jails,
observed that once the litigation ended in a settlement that more or less satisfied
aU parties, the lawyers thought that the "worst" was over and the implementation
"was seen as a natural consequence of the consent decree rather than as the
beginning of a new and complex stage in the case." 14 They were wrong. In fact,
as one scholar has put it, at the enforcement stage, "[p]laintiff and defendant are
thrown into an ongoing relationship of resistance, threat, bargaining, and compromise." 15
Other case studies are notable for their focus on the work of non-parties in the
implementation stage. For example in a study by Philip Cooper examining the
case of "yatt v. Stickne/ 6 , brought on behalf of mentaUy ill patients in Alabama,
Cooper noted that:
It was clear that any meaningful remedy would necessarily include sorne
statement of the standards of care that the courts wouId consider rninimally
adequate for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded. No interest group
concemed with mental health could afford to be left out of that decision. 17
Various citizen committees were set up to monitor implementation of the consent
decree, but the plaintiffs' lawyers were noticeably absent from Cooper's discussion of implementation. Cooper discusses the lawyers' roles in establishing
liability up until the court order in 1972, and then concentrates on the role of
the review panel charged with monitoring implementation until 1975, when the
plaintiffs moved to reopen the case for lack of compliance. What were the
plaintiffs' lawyers doing during that time? This question is not addressed in the
study. 18 Another article written by one of the plaintiffs' lawyers in the case also
fails to discuss in any detail his role in pursuing implementation. 19 This is

13. Id. at 324.
14. Jutta Lungwitz, Stone v. City and County of San Francisco - Impact of a Consent Decree on the
Medical and Mental Health Services of a San Francisco County Jait (unpublished manuscript, on file at The
Center for Law & Society, University of Califomia, Berkeley).
15. Robert D. Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 76 (1978).
16. 344 ESupp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
17. PHILIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES 175 (1988).
18. Nor is it discussed in a law review casenote about the sarne case. See Note, The "yatt Case:
Implementation ofa Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975) (focusing on the
judge and the parties to the litigation).
19. See Jack Drake, Judicial Implementation and "yatt v. Stickney, 32 ArA L. REV. 299 (discussing
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particularly striking in light of the artic1e's focus on why full compliance with the
district court's remedy was not fully achieved. 20
This issue does not ordinarily arise in traditional, private, civillitigation where
there are c1ear steps that the lawyer can follow to collect a money judgment, such
as putting liens on the defendant's property or obtaining a writ of execution. 21
I\:1oreover, there is incentive to pursue a money judgment because the attorney
can bill for the time spent tracking down the judgment and because collecting the
c1ient's judgment is of personal, financial interest to the attorney, particularly if
she is working on a contingent fee basis or has a continuing relationship with ber
client. 22
There are a variety of possible explanations for attorneys' waning enthusiasm
after receiving a favorable trial or settlement outcome but before implementation.
Pursuing implementation in institutional reform litigation involves tremendous
patience and perseverance which is often met with only excuses (sorne of which
may be justified) and delay?3 The loss of interest may be due to the lack of
intellectual stimulation in implementing a court order as opposed to turning to a
new case; naiveté about the difficulty of implementation and the degree of
opposition to be encountered;24 the structural limitations of the c1ass action in
generally Ihe facts of Ihe case and his recommendations regarding effective meIhods of implementation). The
article does mention at least one motion for contempt made by plaintiffs' lawyers. Id. at 308.
20. Id.at307-11.
21. See James J. Brown, Collecting a Judgment, 13 No. 1 Litigation 31 (1986); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 69
(allowing writs of execution in order to enforce civil judgments for payment of money); Chayes, supra note 2, at
1287 (discussing Ihe "traditional" liability mIes and Ihe relative absence of prospective relief).
22. See Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529, 1552-3 (1995)
(identifying client independence and economic incentives as influencing attorney accountability to clients). This
is not to say Ihat attorneys are not often reimbursed for time spent pursuing implementation in institutional
reform Iitigation. See infra note 78, and accompanying text; Balark v. Curtin, 655 F.2d 798, 802-3 (7Ih Ciro
1981) (ordering an award of reasonable attorney's fees in civil rights case, including fees incurred in collecting
judgment).
23. This factor, notably, is not Iimited to institutional reform litigation. Marc Feldman, in an evaluation of
legal services for Ihe poor, recently observed, in Ihe context of landlord tenant disputes, Ihat:
The entry of a favorable judgment by a trial court is a far cry from actually collecting Ihat judgment.
The judgment must he docketed and specified collection procedures leamed and followed. Postjudgment discovery may be required, togeIher wiIh additional submissions and appearances seeking
orders and even sanctions. The Iandlord may or may not continue to he represented by counsel. She will he
difficult to locate, unavailable, and uncooperative. Once assets are located, Ihey must he seized and
converted. Each and every step requires new knowledge, additional lime, energy and "staying power."
Feldman, supra note 22, at 1557 (footnote omitted). Feldman found Ihat legal services lawyers often do not
invest Ihe necessary time and energy at Ihis stage of Ihe Iitigation, which contributes to what Feldman perceives
as "Ihe inadequate solutions ofmuch Legal Services work." Id. at 1556.
. 24. For example, RoIhman and RoIhman observed, after Ihe signing of Ihe consent decree:
[M]any of Ihose involved believed Ihat Ihe case was over at last. The review panel would soon be
selected and its members ... would implement Ihe decree.... [Plaintiffs' lawyer1Ihought he was,
more or less, finished wiIh Ihe suit. ... They all imagined Ihey had signed a treaty ending Ihe war. In
fact, Ihey had only opened a new Iheater for a new campaign.
ROTHMAN & ROTHMAN, supra note 12, at 124. See also Lungwitz, supra note 14, and accompanying text. This
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which the client is often a diffuse and internally inconsistent collection of people,
and therefore unable to monitor its attorney effectively;25 the reliance on judges,
experts, masters, and monitors for fol1ow through, which may be interpreted by
lawyers as usurping their function;26 the indeterminacy of ethical rules,27 which
do not explicitly deal with the lawyer's role during implementation; and the
uncertainty associated with the fact that there is rarely a clear point at which
implementation is accomplished, as the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged in its efforts to determine when irnplernentation has been sufficiently
achieved so that a district court can terminate its oversight. 28
An ethical evaluation ofthe behavior ofthe plaintiffs' lawyer at the implementation stage of institutional reform litigation can be distinguished from the
problems that beset lawyers representing groups at other stages of litigation.
Conflicts between lawyers and clients and among members of the plaintiff group
in these cases can arise throughout the earlier stages of litigation and can take a
number of forms. Derrick Bell has described how parents of African American
children faulted the NAACP for concentrating its litigation strategy on integration at the expense of better schools for those children,29 and Deborah Rhode has

may very weil he directly related to the virtual absence of teaching about enforcement of judicial orders in law
school. See Feldman, supra note 22, at 1587 (perceiving that the widely held view in the classroom is that "with
one 'stroke of the pen' a decision is reached and implemented").
25. See Bell, supra note 9, at 490-91 (noting that public interest lawyers may feel more accountable to the
segment of the general public that is aware of the lawyers' public policy goals and may he contributing more
financially to the effort than to the clients whose case they are bringing); Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From
Ethies to Polities: Confronting Searcity and Faimess in Public Interest Praetice, 58 B.U. L. REv. 337, 341
(1978) (lack of economic leverage hinders a client's ability to keep attorneys accountable); Kane, supra note 8,
at 389 (lack of accountability results in part from the absence of the usual employer-employee relationship and
from the fact that the attorney must represent an "amorphous group of clients"); see also Morris v. Travisono,
310 F. Supp. 857, 859-60 (D.R.I. 1970) (detailing this problem within the context of prisoners' rights litigation).
26. See generally Michael S. Lottrnan, Enforcement of Judicial Decrees: Now Cornes the Hard Part, 1
Mental Disab. L. Rep. 69 (1976) (outlining certain "necessary elements" to compliance, stressing judicial
action and "monitoring bodies"); Debra Dobray, The Role ofMasters in Court Ordered Institutional Reform, 34
BAYLOR L. REv. 581 (1982) (discussing the use of "institutional reform masters" and arguments against them).
Much of the literature on the remedial stage of institutional reform litigation has focused on the role of the judge
without much discussion of the role of plaintiffs' lawyers. See, e.g., Susan P. Sturm, Resolving the Remediai
Dilemma: Strategies ofJudiciallntervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 805 (1990) (describing the various
judicial approaches in the remedial process). On the many and varied powers granted to the judge in class action
litigation, see Special Projeet. supra note 6, at 880-81 (citing as judicial options: control of suit certification as a
class action, modification of the certification order, orders requiring notice to absentees, and formation of
subclasses) and FED. R. Ctv. P. 53 (outlining federal rules regarding special masters).
27. See generally David B. Wilkens, Legal Realismfor Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 468 (1990) (arguing that
the traditional model of legal ethics is fraught with indeterminacy).
28. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) (reviewing district court remedies in the eighteenth year
of litigation); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (reviewing school desegregation efforts in Dekalb County,
Georgia); Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (~ling that courts
should consider good faith efforts at compliance and whether vestiges of past discrimination have heen
eliminated when determining whether to dissolve a desegregation decree); see also John B. Weiner, Institutional
Reform Consent Decrees as Conservers ofSocial Progress, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 355 (1996).
29. Bell, supra note 9, at 516.
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described the confticts among members of a plaintiff group over everything from
the initiation of litigation to choosing an appropriate remedy?O The question of
how the lawyer should balance the diversity of interests among the members of a
plaintiff class in an ethical fashion has been much discussed and remains a vexing
problem. 31
At the implementation stage, however, the remedy has been negotiated by the
parties and ordered by a court and the focus moves from what the remedy ought
to be to how and whether it will be implemented. Although confticts within the
plaintiff group can and do arise at this stage of the litigation, and rnight evolve
into a dispute among plaintiff class members as to whether the defendants should
or should not implement the remedy, such disputes are really about the type of
remedy, not about the plaintiffs' attomey's dutYactively to seek implementation.
For example, Bell describes the ambivalence of sorne African American leaders
in Boston over the implementation of a desegregation plan because of their desire
to put sorne efforts toward improving the educational quality in the predorninantly black schools. 32 Their ambivalence was about the type of remedy chosen,
not about whether and how the lawyer should seek the implementation of the
chosen remedy. This Article addresses the latter issue which raises the question of
what role the lawyer should have in the process by which a client's legal rights
become a reality.
Should lawyers be responsible for aggressively pursuing implementation in
institutional reform litigation, and if so, should their rnisperception of the degree
of difficulty in seeking implementation and their subsequent failure to pursue the
implementation of the remedy be considered unethical?
This Article will look to various approaches to legal ethics to deterrnine if they
can shed light on understanding and defining this issue as one of professional
responsibility. The role of lawyers in the implementation stage of institutional
reform litigation raises questions not only about the lawyer's dutY to her client,
but also about her own competence, as weIl as her dutY to the public and the
court. These are aIl issues covered in general terms by the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct, as weIl
as by scholars who comment on and propose alternative approaches to the ethical
30. Rhode, supra note 9, at 1185-7.
31. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Client Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective
Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation o/Groups, 78 VA. L. REv. 1103 (1992) (examining the
conflict between respect for the individual members of a c1ass and the need to represent them as a whole).
32. Bell, supra note 9, at 482-83. Sometimes such conflicts among c1ass members at this stage of the
litigation can lead a court to create subclasses of the plaintiff c1ass for the purpose of separate representation
during the process of developing a remedy. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst, 612 F.2d 83,110 (3d Ciro 1979)
(finding that decertification of a class of mentally handicapped plaintiffs was not necessary when intra-c1ass
disputes arose); Special Project, supra note 6, at 898-99 (stating that "[s)ubclassing is the most effective and
efficient means of ensuring adequate representation of ail dissimilar interests where those interests are shared by
identifiable, discrete groups"); Developments in the Law - Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1479-82
(1976) (analyzing sorne of the issues that confrontjudges when considering the subclass option).
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obligations of 1awyers. In fact, one need not look beyond the ethical standards
that are already either in force by virtue of ethical codes or simply suggested in
the scholarlyliterature to find the ethical principles that apply to lawyers in the
implementation setting.
ln Part l, 1 will briefly discuss the traditional approaches to legal ethics and
explore what those approaches dictate about the lawyer's conduct in the implementation stage of institutional reform litigation. In Part II, 1 will look at what the
ethics codes have to contribute in this regard. In Part III, 1will discuss critiques of
traditional approaches and the consequences of those critiques for the implementation issue. In Part IV, 1 will address sorne potential objections to the recognition
of an ethical duty to pursue implementation, and in Part V, 1 will conclude with
sorne preliminary observations that might inform future efforts to address this
problem.
1. ThADmONAL LEGAL ETHICS

A. THE ADVERSARY MODEL

Most debate about the ethical implications of lawyers' actions or inactions
centers on sorne aspect or tenet of what can be broadly described as the adversary
system. Discussions of particular situations that face lawyers and may raise
ethical questions are analyzed in terms of whether and how the action that the
lawyer chooses to take in that situation can be justified by one or more of the
basic assumptions of the adversary system. The world of legal scholars who write
about legal ethics can be roughly divided into those who support justifications for
lawyer behavior that are based on one or more of thosé assumptions, and those
who question or reject entirely those assumptions and proffer alternative views
and justifications.
There are many different ways of stating the basic tenets of the adversary
system. Generally, the two basic tenets of the adversary system are, in one
scholar's words, Partisanship and Neutrality.33 Neutrality refers to the attorney's
attitude toward her client and her client's goals. This tenet focuses on the client's
autonomy as a rights-bearing individual, and views the lawyer's role as "help[ing] to preserve and express the autonomy of his client vis-a-vis the legal
system. ,,34 A lawyer's actions may be justified by whether they serve her client's
needs and goals, assuming they are legal, regardless of the content of those needs
33. See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception ofLegal Ethics, 1984 WIS. L. REy. 1529,
1534 (stating that partisanship and neutrality fonn the "standard conception" of legal ethics as seen by moral
philosophers); see also William H. Simon, The [deology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Erhics, 1978 WIS. L .REy. 29, 36-38 (cornbining these principles in the terms "adversary adyocacy" and
"partisan advocacy"); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARY. L. REy. 1083, 1085
(1988) (Iabeling this conception "libertarian").
34. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE
L.J. 1060, 1074 (1976). Fried likens the lawyer's posture toward her client as one of a limited purpose friend
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and goals.J 5 The attorney acts as an agent of the client and is thereby not in a
position to question the validity of the client's goals, and cannot be held
responsible for the consequences that rnight follow the pursuit and achievement
of those goals. This justification posits liberty and autonomy as moral goods,36
. and views access to the law, only possible in our complex legal system through a
lawyer, as an exercise of that autonomy. The lawyer, in order for her actions to be
justifiable, must facilitate this access without interfering, through injection of her
own concept of morality, with the client's autonomy.
In the extreme version, the lawyer loses her identity as a moral agent and
simply becomes an instrument of the client, the proverbial "hired-gun." 37 This is
the only way for the client to enjoy the full extent of her legal rights. From the
point of view of the client, this is a non-consequentialist approach to legal ethics
because it takes the client's moral and legal autonomy and dignity as goods in
themselves, regardless of the ultimate consequences. On the other hand, in
subrnitting to the client's autonomy, the lawyer herself is bound by a purely
consequentialist ethic as the unquestioning ag~nt of client-driven goals. The
justification for a lawyer's morally neutral stance toward her client rests on the
systernic justification of the adversary system, i.e., that the adversary system
leads to truth and justice by pitting partisan advocates against each other before a
neutral arbiter.
Critiques of this justification for lawyers' actions generally center on the
impossibility of a human being, lawyer or not, being a neutral moral agent,38 and
the relative value of such an approach even if it is possible. 39 The agency
approach offers no rationale for why an attorney should value her own client's
individualism and autonomy above the good of the community, except by simply
asserting that they are valuable in themselves. 40 Moreover, there is no justification, sorne argue, for the proposition that every person should be able to exercise
every possible right. 41

who must ireat her cHenl's interests as her own insofar as it is necessary to "preserve and foster the cHenl's
autonomy within the law." Id. at 1073.
35. See generally MonroeH. Freedman, Perjury: The Lawyers' Trilemma, No. 1 Litigation 26 (1975) (going
one step further by contending that in the criminal defense context, lawyers have a dutYat least to tolerate sorne
nonlegal goals of clients, such as committing perjury).
36. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Raie: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 616.
37. /d. at 614. Pepper states that different moral standards apply to lawyers when serving a client than to an
ordinary layperson. The lawyer is an amoral agent and only the client is moral1y accountable.
38. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 617-18 (1985)
(exarnining the concept of the neutral attorney acting in his "institutional role").
39. See id. at 604-5 (discussing the lack of justification for the iransference of reverence for individual rights
in the crirninal context over to the civil context, particularly in the representation of group rights); Eschete,
supra note 7, at 278 (noting that in many situations, the lawyer's personal sense of morality is crucial to being a
good lawyer).
40. Simon, supra note 7, at 1125.
41. Schneyer, supra note 33, at 1540. For an interesting discussion of the irresolvable nature of the diametric
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Partisanship, the other fundamental tenet of the adversary system philosophy,
requires the lawyer to press for every legal advantage to which her client might be
entitled. This tenet is justified by a view of legal disputes, and particularly
litigation, as a contest between parties, each of whom presents as strong a case as
possible before a neutral party, who in turn, from the wealth of infonnation
presented from diametrically opposed views, can discern the truth from the
strengths and weaknesses of each party's arguments and make an infonned
decision. "The adversary system assumes that the most efficient and fair way of
determining the truth is by presenting the strongest possible case for each side of
the controversy before an impartial judge or jury.,,42
Under this theory, the attorney's behavior is a function ofhec institutional role,
not her own personal morality.43 As a society, we have determined that the best
way to achieve justice and simultaneously protect individual rights is through this
system, and the system will only work if each player fulfills a particular role. For
a lawyer to do otherwise would be to usurp the function of the opposing party, the
judge, and the jury. Thus, when a lawyer aggressively cross-examines a witness
whom the lawyer knows to be truthful, or when a lawyer invokes the statute of
limitations in defense of a valid breach of contract claim, she is undertaking acts
that, even if viewed individually as offensive, are condoned by the institution on
the systemic level. 44 Thus, like the Neutrality justification, the justification for
lawyers' actions based on Partisanship is essentially consequentialist in nature,
where the goals being sought are simultaneously the unveiling of truth, the
protection of rights, and the proper functioning of the "sociopolitical system
concerned with the administration of justice in a free society. ,,45
Critiques of the Partisanship justification for legal action focus primarily on its
empirical validity. Partisan representation may not be an effective way of getting
at the truth and can actually be calculated to avoid the truth, such as when one
side indulges in aggressive cross-examination of a truthful witness. Moreover,
inevitable variations in the quality of the representation between parties can lead
to an unbalanced view presented to the tribunal,46 as in the situation where an
individual consumer is up against a large corporation in court. Thus, Deborah
Rhode has argued that partisan representation in fact places procedural fonnalism
above substantive justice at the expense of truth and justice. 47 This, in turn, mises

positions held by the advocates of this position and their critics, see Note, Litigation Ethics: A Niebuhrian View
ofthe Adversarial Legal System, 99 YALE L.I. 1089 (1990).
42. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9 (1975).
43. See generally Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image ofthe Lawyer: Reftections in a Dark Glass, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 379 (1987) (examining the negative public image of the lawyer and whether it isjustified).
44. See generally Fried, supra note 34, at 1073 (arguing that strong partisan advocacy is "necessary to
preserve and foster the c1ient's autonomy within the law").
45. Freedman, supra note 35, at 46.
46. Rhode, supra note 38, at 597.
47. Id. at 604.
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the question whether we should have the degree of trust in our institutions that
justifies partisan behavior. 48
Under the adversary theory, Neutrality is a necessary partner to Partisanship
because it links the goal of facilitating the arbiter's search for truth by means of
aggressive advocacy on both sides with the client's exercise of autonomy in
asserting her legal rights. It is not enough that a lawyer is loyal to her client's
goals, the lawyer must also pursue that client's interests aggressively. Notably,
although the critics of these tenets refute various aspects of the justifications for
the kind of behavior by lawyers that these tenets condone, none of the discussions
of the specifie duties of lawyers in litigation contradicts the basic assumption that
the lawyer is required to advocate strongly on behalf of her client. William
Simon, for example, argues against the Neutrality principle, suggesting instead
that the lawyer must use her own judgment to assess the merits of the client's
claims. But once the lawyer and client have agreed on appropriate goals, the
lawyer is still duty-bound to pursue those goals in such a manner so that they can
realistically be accomplished, even though the lawyer maintains sorne control
over those means as well. 49 Thus, even with aIl of the criticism of the strong
versions of Partisanship and Neutrality, the critics retain a weak version of those
concepts. If they did not, one might begin to wonder what function a hlwyer
serves. 50
B.

TRADITIONAL LEGAL ETHICS APPLIED

The Neutrality justification for conduct by a lawyer based on the client's
interest in the full exercise of her legal rights is easily applied to the implementation setting. If the justification for the lawyer's amoral, functional role vis-a-vis
her client is that this is the only way that the client, as a rights-bearing individual,
can exercise autonomy in relation to the legal system, then it is difficult to
distinguish between the liability and the implementation stage of institutional
reform litigation in terms of the lawyer's role. The client's goal at the implementation stage of the litigation is the vindication of rights that have been recognized
by a court through the implementation of a remedy ordered by a court. 51 In a
sense, Neutrality is simplified at the implementation stage because the client's
48. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Sorne Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTs. 1, 12-13 (1975)
(arguing Ihat Ihe "amorality" of Ihe lawyer is only justifiOO if we have "an enormous degree of trust and
confidence in Ihe institutions Ihemselves"); David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LA WYER
83 (David Luban 00., 1988) (critiquing many of Ihe underlying premises of Ihe adversary system as Ihe best
meIhod to achieve justice).
49. Simon, supra note 7, at 1091 ("The discretionary approach incorporates much ofIhe traditionallawyer
role, including Ihe notion Ihat lawyers can serve justice through zealous pursuit of clients' goals.").
50. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Search for Truth Continues, The Privilege Retained: A Response to Judge
Frankel, 54 U. CaLO. L. REv. 67, 72-73 (1982) (arguing Ihat non-partisan lawyers would leave clients facing
essentially a long series of "judges," wiIhout a true advocate).
51. Fiss, supra note 2, at 2.
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goals have, in a sense, been pre-approved by a court by virtue of the client's
success on the issue of liability.
But there is an even better reason why the Neutrality prinéiple supports the
aggressive pursuit of implementation by a lawyer in institutional reform litigation. The Neutrality principle is based on the notion that the lawyer is the conduit
to the client's full exercise of her legal rights in order to preserve the dignity and
autonomy of the client. In most commercial and personal injury civil litigation,
the client's primary goal is the recovery of damages for injury to economic
interests or physical injury, and promoting the dignity of the individual is the
more abstract concem that justifies the lawyer's service in general. In contrast, in
institutional reform litigation that involves the vindication of individual constitutional rights in organizational settings, the client's primary goal itself can often be
understood as the preservation of dignity. For example, in Brown v. Board of
Education,52 the Supreme Court relied on concepts of ipdividual dignity and
self-esteem in declaring segregation of public schools unconstitutional: "To
separate [school children] from others of similar age and qualifiçations solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds ina way unlikely ever to be
undone... 53 The Court has abided by this rationale for desegregation, stating in
1992 that "the principal wrong of the de jure system [was] the injuries and stigma
inflicted upon the race disfavored by the violation... 54
In "yatt v. Stickney,55 the court found that the conditions still existing in the
defendant hospital for the mentally i11 six months after the court had first ruled
that the conditions were unconstitutional "constituted dehumanizing factors
contributing to the degeneration of the patients' self-esteem... 56 The court went
on to appoint human rights committees to review proposaIs "to ensure that the
dignity and the human rights of patients are preserved... 57
Thus, in institutional reform litigation, as in other types of litigation, the
Neutrality principle is applicable to the lawyer's posture vis-a-vis her client,
insofar as the lawyer must respect and support the client's autonomy when that
autonomy is expressed through the pursuit of legal rights. But the Neutrality

52. 347 V.S. 483 (1954).
53. Id. at 494.
54. Freeman v. Pius, 503 V.S. 467, 485 (1992). See alsa Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schools v.
Dowell, 498 V.S. 237, 258 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Remedying and avoiding tbe recurrence of Ibis
stigmatizing injury have been the guiding objectives of Ibis Court's desegregation jurisprudence. "). But see
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 2062 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he theory tbat black students
suffer an unspecified psychological harm from segregation that retards tbeir mental and educational development ... not only relies upon questionable social science research ratber than constitutional principle, but it also
rests on an assumption of black inferiority."); see alsa Sturm, supra note 26, at 861 (1990) (suggesting that
judicial intervention by itself can legitimize the protection of individual dignity).
55. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
56. Id. at 375.
57. Id. at 376.

Poser in Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics (1996) v. 10. Copyright 1996, Georgetown University Law Center. Used by permission.

126

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 10: 115

principle is often even more directly relevant to bringing about a client's
vindication of her dignity and autonomy in institutional reform litigation than in
other types of litigation. If the dignity and autonomy that the client is seeking are
dependent on how that individual is treated on a daily basis in an institution, then
the achievement of the client's goals requires the implementation of the remedy.
Thus, if, as Charles Fried asserts, the limits of the lawyer's loyalty to the client
and the degree to which the lawyer makes her client's interests her own is the
degree necessary to preserve and foster the client's autonomy within the law,58
the duty of Neutrality continues through the implementation of the remedy. It is
only with implementation, in many of these cases, that a client can truly have her
autonomy and dignity respected by the defendant organization.
As previously discussed, in the representation of an ordinary client, the duty of
Partisanship is justified by the notion that opposing, partisan presentations are the
most effective way of both promoting the client's legal rights and enabling a
neutral arbiter to determine the truth. It is a pragmatic justification which assumes
that truth, justice, and the exercise of individual rights, although given different
weight by different scholars, are valid goals to which the system aspires.
In fact, during the liability stage of litigation, which is the context in which this
duty is generally discussed, there are really two "truths" to be determined. As
Lon Fuller stated: "The lawyer appearing as an advocate before a tribunal
presents, as persuasively as he can, the facts and the Law of the case as seen from
the standpoint of his client's interest." 59
One "truth" is the determination of what actually transpired in the world that
gave rise to the dispute. The aggressive cross-examination of witnesses is to test
this kind of truth and the factfinder's job is to weigh aIl of the testimony, which
has been thoroughly tested, to determine the facts. The second type of "truth"
pertains to the legal, as opposed to the factual, arguments. In difficult cases, the
lawyers must argue and test their opposing views of what the law requires and
from these opposing views, the judge must determine what the law is. 60
In one sense, after the plaintiff has won at the liability stage of institutional
reform litigation, and a remedy has been ordered, the tribunal is no longer a
neutral arbiter and the adversary apparatus seems to dissolve. The judge has made
findings of fact and endorsed a plan by which the defendant typically must
expend vast sums of money to change an institution. Aiso diminishing the
appearance of the triangular relationship at the core of the adversary system, and
therefore the need for partisan advocacy, is the fact that the judge, who is often

58. Fried, supra note 34, at 1073.
59. 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958), reprinted in Report ofthe Commission on Professionalism 10 the Board
ofGovemors and the House ofDe/egates ofthe ABA, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986) (emphasis added).
60. 1 am not suggesting that judges "discover" the law in the naturallaw sense. Rather, 1 merely mean that
when the law is not c1ear, the function of opposing counsel is to present differing interpretations of the law so
that the judge can make an informed decision.
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deeply involved in creating the remedy and monitoring implementation, is seen
as aligned with the plaintiff. 61
But in institutional reform litigation, the deterrnination of the facts and law to
reach a judgment as to liability for the underlying cause of action is only the first
set of "truths" that a judge must deterrnine. The judicial decree that results from
such a deterrnination creates a new legal regime that imposes specifie obligations
on the defendants. In the implementation stage, the factual "truth" that still
remains to be determined is whether the defendants are complying with the order,
and the legal "truth" is whether the order effectively vindicates the clients' rights,
whether it should be modified, and whether the defendants' lack of compliance is
unconstitutional or contemptuous. For example, in Board of Education of
Oklahoma City v. Dowell,62 the Supreme Court set the legal standard for
dissolution of a desegregation decree as requiring a showing by the defendant
that it had complied with the decree "for a reasonable period of time" and that the
vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated ."to the extent practicable.,,63 In Freeman v. Pitts,64 an action brought by a defendant school district to
dismiss the court's jurisdiction over its efforts to desegregate seventeen years
after the initial order, the issue before the court was "the degree of compliance
with a school desegregation decree. ,,65
Although the lawyer's role in the implementation stage is not the traditional
one of asserting a factual situation in the past and proposing a legal interpretation,
the task of creating and monitoring a present and future factual situation and
applying it to legal standards of compliance also requires partisan advocacy.
Initial remedial orders are almost invariably non-specific,66 and are open to
various interpretations once the practical problems of compliance are raised. 67

61. See Kane, supra noIe 8, al 405-09 (suggesting a partnership between the judge and the plaintiffs' altomey
for solving representational problems in institutional reform litigation); Chayes, supra note 2, al 1298 (the
decree "prolongs and deepens, rather than terminates, the court's involvement with the dispule"); Colin S.
Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L.
REv. 43, 104 (1979) ("Once a judge has found a violation of law, he is permilted - indeed, expected - to
become an advocate for ils correction. ").
62. 498 V.S. 237 (1991).
63. Id. al 249.
64. 503 V.S. 467 (1992).
65. Id. al 474. See also Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 V.S. 367 (1992) (setting out conditions
under which consent decrees in institutional reform litigation can be modified).
66. See Feliciano v. Barcelo, 672 F. Supp. 591, 623 (D.P.R. 1986) (finding that the correctional system of
Puerto Rico had not brought ils facilities up to "constitutional" standards in terms of shelter, sanitation, medical
care and safety as required by a previously issued injunction); Goldstein, supra note 15, at 64-71 (discussing the
vagueness of initial court orders and suggesting more specific orders, escalating in intrusiveness as noncompliance continues).
67. See Feliciano, 672 F. Supp. at 623 (after an initial order was not complied with, the judge ordered the
monitor to hold hearings to get factual input from all parties); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 11 15, 1162 (5th Ciro
1982) (outlining the powers and limitations on a special master appointed in case involving the Texas
Department of Corrections); Special Project, supra note 6, at 817-21 (discussing various ways in which a decree
may need to he modified during implementation).
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The issues about the scope and meaning of the parties' obligations and the parties'
compliance with them are issues of fact and law that are often continuously
litigated during the implementation stage. 68 Specifie issues of law, such as the
constitutionality of remedial measures, are the particular responsibility of the
lawyers, and are not delegable to masters or monitors. 69
Furthermore, there is evidence from the cases and case studies that the
plaintiffs' counsel, even if not solely responsible for monitoring compliance, is
expected to maintain a posture of vigilance and partisansbip at the remedial stage.
In Collins v. Schoonfield, a relatively successful jail conditions case in which no
third-party monitor was appointed and the plaintiffs' attorneys undertook primary
responsibility for monitoring compliance, the attorneys themselves believed that
they should maintain an adversarial posture during the compliance stage. 70 In
Bradley v. Milliken,71 after the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order of
an inter-district busing remedy, and remanded the case, the district court noted
that "[n]o party has ever taken the initiative in the remedial phase of these
proceedings. For example, although unfavorable Monitoring Commission Reports of lagging implementation of court-ordered remedial programs provided
many opportunities for initiative, the plaintiffs have falled to take action."n The court
interpreted the plaintiffs' lawyers' fallure to seek compliance with a particular portion of
the court's decree as a tacit acceptance of the defendants' fallure to comply:
Notwithstanding the numerous reports subrnitted by the Commission, however,
no party to this litigation has filed any pleadings to challenge in an adversary
proceeding the reason for the Detroit Board's lagging implementation of the
remedial programs. The silence of the parties, particularly the plaintiffs, leads
the court to believe that the interest of aH parties in this component has been
reasonably satisfied. 73

Sirnilar b~havior on the part of the plaintiffs' lawyers' was discussed from the
defendants' point of view by Dudley Spiller in bis study of Hamilton v. Schiro74 , a

68. See Feliciano, 672 F. Supp. at 625 (ordering that infonnation about conditions of confinement he
continually collected); see a/sa Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ, 607 F.2d 737, 747-48 (6th Ciro 1979) (ruling that
District Court judge may not abdicate his power by receiving the advice of "legal experts" in the field of school
administration); Susan P. Stunn, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REv. 981, 989 (1993) ("[C]ourts
c1early engage in legal activity when they fonnulate and enforce injunctions .... Courts make and enforce law
even when they act on indeterminate, nondoctrinal, remedial principles.").
69. See Reed, 607 F.2d at 747-48 (ruling that the District Court must use its own resources, not the help of
special masters, to make legal determinations).
70. M. Kay Harris, A Case Study ofCollins V. Schoonfie/d, in AfTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL
DECREES IN CORRECTIONAL SETI1NGS 355, 399 (1977). See a/sa Goldstein, supra note 15, at 69 (arguing that
continued pressure from the plaintiffs' attorney during compliance will prevent the court from issuing more
intrusive orders).
71. 460 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
72. Id. at 302.
73. Id. at 318-19.
74. 338 F.Supp. 1016 (E.D.La. 1970).
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prison refonn case. Spiller observed that, to support the defendants' contention
that one of the provisions of the decree was unenforceable, the city attorney
pointed out that "neither the special master nor the plaintiffs' attorney had actively
sought implementation ofthat particular provision. His inference was that, since neither
sought implementation, the provision was legally unenforceable.,75
Thus, it appears that both lawyers and judges assume that plaintiffs' lawyers
have a duty to pursue implementation of institutional remedies. In fact, this
assumption is often evident on the face of the order. For example, consent decrees
sometimes include a provision for the award of attorneys' fees for time spent
enforcing the judgment. 76
Moreover, there is evidence that continued partisan advocacy can have a
positive effect on implementation. In a study of Taylor v. Sterret, a jail refonn
case in Dallas, one scholar attributed the success of the court's order in part to the
fact that the prisoners' lawyers were committed to the case throughout its
implementation stage during which time they "gathered infonnation on jail
conditions, monitored compliance, followed developments in similar cases, and
filed motions.',n In Collins v. Schoonfield, the judge stated that he thought that
the relationship between the defendants charged with implementation and the
plaintiffs' attorneys was one of the three factors primarily responsible for
compliance with the court's orders. 78 In another case study of corrections
litigation, it was reported that upon a motion by the plaintiffs' lawyers, the judge
awarded them attorneys' fees after finding that the defendants were not meeting
their court-ordered obligations, and that "aIl of the violations would have
continued but for the efforts of plaintiffs' counsel." 79
M. Kay Harris, in her case study of Collins, described the active involvement
of the plaintiffs' lawyers in seeking compliance with the court's orders, which
included the following steps:
Cl) get the defendants to commit themselves on paper (hence the requirement for the
regular90 day compliance reports); (2) talk to inmates extensively; (3) do on-the-spot
investigation and inspection in the facility to obtain a balanced view of what both
sides have reported; and (4) negotiate or apply pressure from a position of strength, an
option that follows on attainment of the first three stepS.80

75. Dudley P. Spiller, A Case Study of Hamilton v. Schiro, in AFfER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION Of JUDICIAL
DECREES IN CORREcnONAL SE.TI1NGS 247, 288 (1977) (footnotes omined).
76. See. e.g., World Teacher Sem. v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Jefferson County, 406 N.W.2d 173,177 (Iowa 1987);
see a/so Reed v. Cleveland, 607 F.2d 737, 742 (6th Ciro 1979) (billable time spent by plaintiffs' attorneys for
enforcement of decree submitted to the judge).
77. Anthony Champagne, The Theory ofLimited Judicia/lmpact: Reforming the Dallas Jail as a Case Study,
in THE POLmCAL SCIENCE Of CRIMINAL JUSTICE 93 (Stuart Nagel et al. eds., 1983).
78. Harris, supra note 70, at 386.
79. M. Kay Harris, A Case Study of Holland v. Donelon, in AFfER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION Of JUDlCIAL
DECREES IN CORREcnONAL SE1TINGS 143, 191 (1977).
80. Harris, supra note 70, at 395-96. ln another corrections case, it was reported that the plaintiffs played an
important role in monitoring compliance by "investigating the extent of compliance; filing motions with the
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The author of the study found that the Collins case was generally acknowledged
by the participants from aH sides to have had a "positive impact" on jail
conditions. 81
Susan Sturm, in an article based on a survey of public interest corrections
litigators, documents a general agreement among members of organizations that
specialize in corrections litigation that "[t]he process of monitoring and enforcing a remedy requires the continued presence and involvement of plaintiffs'
counsel," and that implementation is enhanced when the attorney acts as an
aggressive monitor. 82 Yet, in his study of lawyers involved in institutional reform
litigation in the area of education, Paul Tractenberg found that only about half of
the plaintiffs' lawyers were involved at the implementation stage,83 and most of
them saw their role in implementation as neutral. At the same time, however,
sorne of these lawyers acknowledged that they should have monitored the
remedy and its enforcement more actively.84
The ethical justifications for the principles of Neutrality and Partisanship are
particularly persuasive when applied to lawyer conduct at the implementation
stage of institutional reform litigation. Not only is a client's dignity at a somewhat
abstract level promoted by seeking vindication through legal channels, but, as
discussed above, in this type of litigation a client's own, personal dignity might
often depend on the actual vindication of legal rights. The need for aggressive
advocacy in order to persuade recalcitrant defendants to foHow through with
court-ordered change is clear from the cases,85 and, as Sturm found, the actual
vindication of individual rights in organizational settings through the implementation of
remedies is promoted when plaintiffs' lawyers actively monitor the progress of
implementation. Thus, the traditional renets of legal ethics support the recognition of an
ethical duty for lawyers actively to seek the implementation of remedies.

Il.

THE ETHICS CODES

The principles of Neutrality and Partisanship, although broadly descriptive of
sorne of the general interests at stake in the attorney-client relationship, are not
always sufficiently instructive to a lawyer deciding upon a particular course of
court designed 10 infonn the court of noncompliance, obIain greater compliance. and obtain furtber relief; and
cooperating with the media." Harris, supra note 79, at 190.
8 I. Harris, supra note 70, at 405.
82. Susan P. Stunn, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 734 (1993).
See also Susan P. Stunn, Lawyers at the Prison Gates: Organizational Structure and Corrections Advocacy, 27
U. MICH. l.L. REFORM l, 16 (1993) ("Innovative approaches to fact-finding, remedial fonnulation, and
monitoring are often key to successful implementation of corrections decrees.").
83. Tractenberg, supra note 5, at 393. Tractenberg hypothesized that this response to his survey indicated that
many plaintiffs' lawyers did not envision a fonnal implementation stage, rather than that they did not participate
in implementation. II is not cIear why the fonner hypothesis is more probable. See also supra notes 14-20 and
accompanying text.
.
84. Id. at 406.
85. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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action. Moreover, it is not only broad principles but also specifie mIes which the
American Bar Association and aIl of the states have detertnined should guide
lawyers in understanding their ethical obligations. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct86 were adopted by the American Bar Association in 1983 and
replaced the Model Code of Professional Responsibility87 as the Bar's official
code of ethics. Most states have adopted versions of the Model Rules, although
sorne states have retained versions of the Model Code.
Neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code wholeheartedly adopts the
principles of Neutrality and Partisanship.88 Moreover, research has not uncovered any instance where their provisions have formed the basis of a legal action or
a disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer for failing to pursue the implementation of a .court order or consent decree. 89 Nevertheless, analysis of these
provisions indicates that they do have something to say about lawyers' duties in
the implementation stage when they are examined with that issue in mind. The
provisions concerning competence and conflicts of interest form the basis for a
duty to pursue implementation, while a variety of other sections support that duty.
A.

COMPETENCE

Canon 6 of the Model Code states that "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
Competently.,,90 Inciuded under the mbric of competent representation is the
duty only to take on matters which the lawyer is competent to handle,9l to prepare
adequately for a matter,92 and not to neglect a matter. 93 The Ethics Committee of
the American Bar Association has interpreted this provision to mean that a lawyer
cannot take on more cases than she can competently handle, and must withdraw if
she finds herself in that position. 94 The ABA has adopted a stated preference for
quality over quantity of representation, even in the legal services context where
lawyers are under constant pressure to take on new matters. 95
86. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr (1983) [hereinafIer MODEL RULES).
87. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafler MODEL CODE).
88. See generally Schneyer, supra noie 33 (many liIigation lactics Ihal would clearly advance a clieni's
interests are noneIheless violations of Ihe Madel Code and Madel Rules); Charles W. Wolfram, Parts and
Wholes: The lntegrity of the Model Rules, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHleS 861 (1993) (critiquing the Madel Rules,
particularly Ihe question of wheIher Ihe Rules form a fully integrated whole).
89. But see DiPaima v. Seldman, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219, 221-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (malpractice action for
failure to collect judgment); ABA Comm. on EIhics and Professional Responsibility, Informai Op. 1010 (1967)
(duty to disclose to client Ihat due to attorney error, judgment was no longer collecIible); Green v. McKaskle,
770 F.2d 445, 446-47 (5Ih Ciro 1985) (intervention by individual in class acIion perrnissible when based on
claim Ihat intervenor was not adequately represented in Ihe class action).
90. MaDEL CODE Canon 6.
91. MODEL CODE DR 6-101 (A)(1), EC 6-1, EC 6-3.
92. MaDEL CODE DR 6-101 (A)(2), EC 6-3.
93. MODEL CODE DR 6-101 (A)(3).
94. ABA Comm. on EIhics and Professional Responsibility, Formai Op. 347 (1981).
95. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informai Op. 1359 (finding that Ihe duties of
competence and non-neglect might entail eSlablishing priorities for accepting cases so Ihat Ihe quality of
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The provisions of the Model Code are quite specifie about what constitutes
quality under the Code. Canon 7 exhorts lawyers to represent clients "zealously
within the bounds of the law. ,,96 The disciplinary mIes prohibit a lawyer from
intentionally failing to "seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means,,,97 and from prejudicing or damaging his client. 98 AIthough the lawyer is permitted in accordance with the lawyer's professional
judgment to forego asserting certain client rights,99 the Code makes clear that the
lawyer must always have in rnind the best interests of the client,IOO and the
decision to forego legal objectives is ultimately up to the client. 101
At first glance, the Model Rules appear to have softened the competence and
zeal requirements of the Code. Model Rule 1.1 defines competent representation
as having "the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation" but does not specifically prohibit neglect.
Model Rule 1.3 states that "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client. " 102
These competence provisions in the Model Rules, taken together, stand
primarily for two propositions. First, lawyers have a dutYto carry through on aIl
matters. This is stated outright in the comment to Rule 1.3,103 as well as in other
provisions. For example, the comment to Rule 1.16, which deals with withdrawal, states that a lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it
can be performed to completion. 104 Second, competence and diligence require a
lawyer to hold a current client's interests in high regard and work diligently to
serve them. Thus, although the comment to Rule 1.3 states that "a lawyer is not
bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client," 105 it also
states that the lawyer should act "with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy." 106 In commenting upon the
represenIation does not suffer because of Ihe quantily of cases). See alsa Bellow & Ketiieson, supra note 25, at
355-60 (discussing Ihe tension between Ihe aspirations to make services available and Ihe obligations in Canons
6 and 7 to provide competent advocacy, regardless of resources).
96. MODEL CODE Canon 7, EC 7-1, 7-19 (1974).
97. MODELCODEDR 7-101 (A)(1).
98. MODEL CODE DR 7-101 (A)(3).
99. MODEL CODE DR 7-101(B)(I).
100. MODEL CODE EC 7-9.
101. MODEL CODE EC 7-8.
102. M<;>DEL RULES Rule 1.3.
103. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cm!. 3 ("Unless Ihe relationship is terminated ... a lawyer should carry through
to conclusion all maners undertaken for a c1ien!."). See a/sa MODEL CODE EC 2-31 ("Full availability of legal
counsel requires boIh Ihat persons be able to obtain counsel and Ihat lawyers who undertake representation
complete Ihe work involved. ").
104. MODEL RULES Rule 1.16 cm!. 1.
105. MODEL RULES Rule 1.3 cm!. 1.
106. Id. This is a carryover from Ihe mandate of Ihe Madel Cade Canon 7 Ihat "a lawyer should represent a
client zealously wiIhin Ihe bounds of Ihe law." MODEL CODE Canon 7. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAzARD & W.
WILUAM HODES, THE LAw OF LAWYERlNG: A lfANoBOOK ON nIE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr 7 (2d
ed. 1990) (recounting Ihat Ihe Madel Rules replaced "zeal" wiIh "reasonable diligence and promptness").
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duty of zeal, Geoffrey Hazard has stated that "the single most fundamental
principle of the law of lawyering is that so long as lawyers stay within the bounds
of the law, they serve society best by zealously serving their clients, one at a
time." 107
B, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The primary contexts in which confiicts affecting the attorney-client relationship arise and are relevant to the issues addressed in this Article, involve a lawyer
who concurrently represents two clients with differing interests and therefore
cannot be completely loyal to one client without interfering with the representation or relationship with the other, and a lawyer whose own interests confiict with
those of a client. Thus, under the Model Code, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-105(A)
requires that a lawyer decline a new client if acceptance of the employment
would adversely affect the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of another
client; and DR 5-101(A) prohibits the acceptance of employment if the lawyer's
own interests would adversely affect the representation,lOs Sirnilarly, under
Model Rule 1.7, confiicts arise when one client's interests are adverse to another
client's,l09 and when the representation of one client is "materially lirnited" by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a third party, or the lawyer's own
interests. 110 The comment to Rule 1.7 makes clear that the primary concern of the
Rule is the loyalty implicit in the lawyer-client relationship and the fear that
representing adverse interests would impair that loyalty. III
Taken together, the ethics roles on competence and confticts support the
recognition of a duty on lawyers to pursue the implementation of remedies in
institutional reform litigation. Because these cases, usually class actions, remain
open until the implementation is accomplished,112 and the lawyer retains sorne
specifie duties, such as adding new claims and bringing contempt motions, 113 the
dutYto continue the representation of a client to completion of the matter wouId
also seem to require that lawyers' ethical duties continue as well. Thus, the duty
of competence requires that lawyers continue to advocate on behalf of their
clients and serve their best interests during the implementation stage of litigation.

107. HAzARD & HODES, supra note 106, at 24.
108. There are exceptions to bath of these rules. The prohibition is lifte<! under Madel Code DR 5-IOI(A)
with the client's consent and under DR 5-105(A) if, along with consent, it is "obvious" that the lawyer can
adequately represent the client's interests.
109. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(a) (1987).
110. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b). There are exceptions to these prohibitions if the lawyer reasonably believes
there will be no effect on her relationship with her client or her representation of her client and she obtains client
consent. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(a)(1)-(2), 1.7(b)(1)-(2).
Ill. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7 cmt. 3.
112. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
113. See. e.g., Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d HOI, 1103 (5th Ciro 1988)(stating that individual members of
the class must pursue any equitable or declaratory claims through the class representative).
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Lawyers who lose interest in the case after the liability stage or after a consent
decree is signed may be violating the conflicts roles, depending on their reason
for losing interest. Thus, a lawyer who fails to pursue implementation aggressively rnight simply want to move on to the next case, a violation of Model Rule
1.7(b) and DR 5-105(A)'s prohibitions against representing clients when the
representation would impair the loyalty to another client and prevent the lawyer
from carrying out an appropriate course of action. 114 The desire to move on to the
next case rnight also stem from the lawyer's interest in setting precedent over
seeking implementation, in which case the lawyer is putting her objectives, the
creation of precedent, ahead of the client's objectives, the actualization of a legal
right that has been won in court. ll5 In that situation, the lawyer's own interests
would be limiting her responsibilities to her client, also a violation of Model Rule
1.7(b), and DR 5-101(A). Thus, the conflicts roles wouId indicate that a lawyer
has a dutYto continue her advocacy on behalf of her client as during the liability
stage, even if that means turning away new clients.
In addition to the mIes on competence and conflicts, there are other provisions
that are relevant to the ethics of implementation. The Model Code and Model
Rules both address the issue of third parties paying for litigation (often the
situation in institutional reform cases) and make it clear that lawyers should not
be influenced in their professional judgment by outside sources of fees. 116 The
ABA has interpreted these provisions to permit the Board of Directors of a group
providing legal services to set policy,117 but once a case is accepted, lawyers
cannot then change priorities in a way that wouId affect their representation. 118
Although there do not seem to be any cases that directly address these types of
conflicts in the context of institutional reform litigation, the issue has arisen in the
legal services context: The issue arises because, in addition to the roles on
conflicts, the ethics roles also state that lawyers should help make legal counsel
available l19 and should participate in pro bono activities, particularly legal
services, without the expectation of a fee. 120 If interpreted to mean that in the
context oflegal services, one has a dutYto serve as many clients as possible, these
provisions potentially conflict with the provisions on competence and conflicts of

114. This interpretation of Model Rule 1.7(b) is buttressed by Comment 4. MaDEL RULES Rule 1.7 cm!. 4
(1996).
115. There is a variety of other more persona! objectives that might he driving public interest lawyers in such
a situation, such as ego gratification and the desire to change society. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 9, at 493
(positing that the desire to change society or to reinforce the attorney' s sense of her abilities may direct the suit
toward goals other than those that would he best for the plaintiffs); Kane, supra note 8, at 395 (discussing the
same subject in the context of settlement negotiations).
116. MaDEL CODE DR 5-107(B); MaDEL RULES Rule 1.8(0, 1.7 cm!. 10.
117. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professiona! Responsibility, Forma! Op. 334 (1974).
118. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informai Op. 1359 (1976).
119.. Model Code Canon 2 states "a lawyer should assist the lega! profession in fulfilling its dutY to make
legal counsel available... MaDEL CODE Canon 2.
120. MaDEL RULES Rule 6.1 (1993).
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interest. 121 Those provisions are concerned with the quality of representation,
while an emphasis on serving as many clients as possible marks a concern with
the quantity of representation. In the context of institutional reform litigation, a
similar argument might be made for the setting of precedent in many cases over
the implementation of that precedent in fewer cases. 122
Gary Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson have discussed this dilemma and concluded
that the Model Code requires that even legal services lawyers have an obligation
to provide quality over quantity. Relying mainly on the Code provisions involving competence and conflicts of interests, as weIl as ethics opinions, 123 they argue
that the paucity of legal services for the indigent does not excuse lawyers from
their obligations to represent their clients competently and conflict-free. 124
Moreover, a concern with quantity over quality in the legal services context can
often end up actually benefitting fewer clients because even when more clients
winjudgments, insufficient attention to enforcingjudgments leaves them without
a satisfactory resolution to their legal problems. 125
Having established that under the roles of ethics there is sorne dutYon lawyers
to pursue institutional remedies zealously, there is sorne difficulty applying those
same roles in justifying their failure to do so. The most likely justifications lie in
the notions of consent and withdrawal. Model Rule 1.2 allows the lawyer to limit
the objectives of representation "if the client consents after consultation." 126 The
comment states that this can include limitations on specifie objectives or means,
although it cannot so limit the representation that the attorney can no longer
"provide competent representation to a client." 127 If the objectives are so limited
by agreement and the client does not stick to that agreement, under Rule 1.16, the
attorney is justified in withdrawing from the case. 128 The attorney may not
withdraw from one client, however, merely because she is retained by another
client whose case she prefers because, in most cases, this would likely result in "a
material adverse effect on the interests of the client." 129 Absent such termination,
the lawyer "should carry through to conclusion aIl matters undertaken for a
client. If a lawyer's employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship
terminates when the matter has been resolved." 130 Thus, in the context of

121. For an extensive discussion of this conflict, see Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 25, at 354-63.
122. Madel Code EC 5-23 acknowledges the risk imposed by placing the setting of precedent over client
rights but doesn't really resolve il. See a/sa infra notes 196-198 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 347 (1981) (stating that
legal services lawyers must limit their representation of new clients when it will huIt old clients, and evincing a
preference for existing clients over future clients).
124. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 25, at 353.
125. See supra note 23.
126. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2.
127. MODEL RULES Rule 1.1.
128. MODEL RULES Rule 1.16 cml. 8.
129. MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(b).
130. MODEl RULES Rule 1.3 cml. 3.
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institutional reform litigation, both the consent rules and the withdrawal rules
would require an explicit agreement between the attorney and her client that the
attorney will represent the client aggressively through the liability stage but if
they win, she will not necessarily pursue the remedy with the same degree of zeal,
particularly if other matters arise. Barring such circumstances, there is little doubt
that under the ethics rules as they now stand, there is a duty on lawyers to pursue
implementation of remedies zealously.
Under the ethics rules, the attorney-client relationship is a cooperative endeavor in which the client defines the objectives of the litigation "because
realization of these objectives is the very reason the lawyer was hired in the first
place,"131 and the lawyer determines the means and strategies for attaining those
objectives,132 subject to consultation with the client. 133 The failure to pursue
implementation in institutional reform litigation can be described as resulting
from a lack of zeal, loyalty and/or conflict of interest.
III.

NON-'fRADITIONAL LEGAL ETHICS

If one is skeptical of grounding ethical duties in sorne aspect of the adversary
system or in the indeterminate patchwork of ethics codes, then the justification
for the aggressive pursuit of implementation by the plaintiffs' lawyer based on
those prernises is equally unsatisfying. Therefore, it must be determined what
obligations the plaintiffs' lawyer has at the implementation stage of institutional
reform litigation under alternative approaches to legal ethics.
AlI of the alternative approaches to legal ethics discussed below share the
prernise that in order to properly address the professional responsibility of
lawyers, the scope of inquiry must be broadened to include considerations
beyond the traditional principles of the adversary system and the ethics codes.
The shared rationale for rejecting the traditional approach to adversary ethics is
concern for the effect that it has on lawyers' lives, third parties and on the overall
achievement of just results. 134 At the same time, however, most of the critics of
the adversary system justification do not in turn set out comprehensive alternative
approaches to legal ethics. Yet it is possible to glean from their critiques
considerations relevant to the issue at hand.
One approach centers on the need for lawyers to rely on their own sense of
moral responsibility to justify their professional behavior. This approach takes
seriously the adversary system's goals of truth and justice but does not see the

131. HAzARD & HODES, supra note 106, a128.
132. MaDEL RULES Rule 1.2 crnt. 1. See a/so CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHles 156-57 (1986)
(discussing the "division of realrns" between lawyer and client).
133. MaDEL RuLES Rule 1.2(a).
134. See infra notes 136-44 and accornpanying text (suggesting alternatives to adversary ethics in the
institutional refonn setting).
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behavioral components of the adversary system as an effective way of reaching
those goals.
Rhode, for example, argues that the professional ideology promoted by ethical
roles is incoherent because institutional constraints make the realization of the
ultimate goals impossible. 135 As an alternative to the extreme versions of
Neutrality and Partisanship, Rhode suggests that, within certain bounds, lawyers
assume personal, moral responsibility for their professional actions. 136 The
boundaries of ethical behavior are determined by the degree to which the lawyer
can justify the consequences of her professional activity. This process of moral
justification, in turn, forces the lawyer to face the larger normative questions
about what her own individual responsibility entails.
Along sirnilar lines, Simon has suggested an approach to legal ethics that
involves a "professional duty of reffective judgment." 137 Simon advocates a
discretionary approach to choosing cases whereby the lawyer assesses the
internaI merits of individual cases to determine whether they are worth pursuing.
In making this assessment, Simon suggests that the lawyer acknowledge the
tensions brought on by the adversary system 138 and, when adherence to the
adversary approach to these problems would work an unjust resolution, always
resolve them in a way in which substantive justice is best served. 139 Unlike
Rhode, Simon suggests that discretion is bounded by the moral concerns of the
profession rather than individual perceptions of morality. This differs from
Rhode's approach to professional responsibility because it emphasizes the
lawyer's duty to keep in rnin~ the purposes of legal roles when deciding how best
to represent a client. These purposes are a check on excessive partisanship. In
exercising the "professional duty of reffective judgment," an outgrowth of the
lawyer's commitment to the "legal values" of the legal culture in which the
lawyer practices,140 the lawyer must at times determine what would constitute
substantive justice in a particular case,141 what the purpose of a particular legal
role iS,142 and how to frame the case to increase the likelihood that the relevant
law will be properly applied. 143
How would these approaches to the lawyer's role inform the duty of the
plaintiffs' lawyer at the implementation stage of institutional reform litigation?
Under Rhode's approach, the plaintiffs' attomey's conduct at the implementation

135. Rhode, supra noie 38. al 626-27.
136. Id. al 643-44.
137. Simon, supra noie 7, al 1083.
138. See id. (showing the lension belWeen substance and process, purpose and fonn, and broad and narrow
framing).
139. Id. al 1096-98; Wilkens, supra noIe 27, al 505 (calling this purposivism).
140. Simon, supra noie 7. al 1120.
141. Id. al 1098.
142. Id. al 1103.
143. Id. al 1108-09.
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stage would be driven by whatever the attorney deterrnined to be her moral
responsibility after winning the case at the liability stage. Rhode, like other
supporters of this view,l44 appears to assume that this approach wouId lead to
fairly consistent results among different lawyers once they carefully considered
the larger normative questions concerning the goal of our legal system and their
appropriate role in il. For example, Rhode states that ethical decisions must be
made in the context of a "realistic social and economic backdrop." 145 Andreas
Eschete argues that a personal sense of morality is crucial to being a good lawyer
because it is often impossible to identify one clear client interest, particularly in
institutional reform litigation. 146 This puts the responsibility on the lawyer for
taking into consideration all the interests and shaping a case in accordance with
the "underlying public values of the legal system." 147
These considerations about justice and fairness provide less guidance in the
context of institutional reform than they might in other contexts because there are
widely differing views about the purpose and the effectiveness of institutional
reform. For example, Abram Chayes has argued that institutional reform litigation is an appropriate way of vindicating the rights of individuaIs because of the
particular institutional attributes of judges, 148 while Owen Fiss has emphasized
judges' function in giving "concrete meaning and application to our constitutional values." 149 Others have argued that courts should not entertain institutional
reform cases because they lack the capacity to create and implement effective
remedies. 150 This approach cannot inform the scope of the ethical dutY at the
implementation stage of institutional reform litigation because any attorney
inclined toward this view presumably would not have gotten involved in the case
in the first place. A middle ground was suggested by Stuart Scheingold, who has
argued that institutional reform litigation, by virtue of the limitations of the
judicial process, cannot bring about substantial social change but may be
valuable for its symbolic contributions:
Instead of thinking of judicially asserted rights as accomplished social facts or
as moral imperatives, they must be thought of, on the one hand, as authoritatively articulated goals of public policy and, on the other, as political resources of
unknown value in the bands ofthose who want to alter the course of public policy.151

Because all of these views are based on differing, but presumably honest,

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 48, at 12-13; Eschete, supra note 7, at 280-83.
Rhode, supra note 38, at 607.
Eschete, supra note 7, at 280-83.
Id. at 281.
Chayes, supra note 2, at 1307-09.
Fiss, supra note 2, at 9.
See generally DAVID L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS & SOCIAL POLICY (1977); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE (1991).
151. STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLmes OF RiGHTS 6-7 (1974).
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perceptions of reality, it would be personally, morally respectable for an attorney
to adhere to any of them. One view of the lawyer, represented here by references
to Chayes and Fiss, would require a lawyer who consults her own personal
morality for ethical guidance and who undertook a case with the belief that she
couId not only win the case, but improve her client's situation, to pursue
implementation. Theother view, presented by Scheingold, regards the attempt to
bring about actual change through litigation alone as futile. A lawyer adhering to
this view rnight initiate institutional reform litigation solely for its symbolic value
and therefore would not feel under a personal moral responsibility to pursue
implementation. 152
Under Simon's conception of ethical discretion, it is difficult to know the
relevant "legal values" that a lawyer is expected to invoke in the exercise of her
ethical discretion. Simon states that the overall goal of the lawyer in the exercise
of discretion must be to "seek justice," 153 but as the above discussion demonstrates, justice in the context of institutional reform litigation is not a settled
concept. It is certainly plausible for an attorney to perceive that aggressive
pursuit of implementation comports with the purposes of law, particularly after
such implementation has been specifically ordered by a judge. On the other hand,
if justice is perceived as the setting of precedent for the benefit of future
claimants, it rnight not require aggressive monitoring. Thus, at least on the
surface, neither Rhode's nor Simon's conception of legal ethics suggests a
definitive ethical duty on lawyers to seek implementation.
David Luban has developed a model of ethical decisionmaking to address this
issue in the context of public interest practice. Arguing that the traditional
approaches to legal ethics are inadequate to address the problems of rationing that
face public interest lawyers, he proposes a new approach. Luban posits a political
action model of public interest litigation which he calls "dirty hands," and argues
that attorneys should have a lot of discretion in deterrnining litigation strategy,
assurning that the ends of litigation are "both just and weighty.,,154 Public
interest lawyers are justified in recruiting and manipulating their clients for the
sake of "just and weighty" ends, and in deciding which side to take when a
conflict arises among the class members in a class action.
Luban's concept of political action justifies departures from the normal scope
of attorney-client duties. He argues that political action is a distinct human
endeavor for which there is a distinct morality. One risks personal manipulation
and betrayal in the attempt to achieve political ends and the rewards of political

152. Arguably, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers did not expect desegregation to resuit directly, but
rather wanted to get a proclamation of constitutional rights in order to arouse public awareness and force the
political branches to act. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BoARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERtCA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976).
153. Simon, supra note 7, at 1090.
154. LUBAN, supra note 7, at 323 and chs. 14-15.
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cornradeship.155 Thus, whatever the potential ethieal problems, they are acceptable in the context of class-based institutional reform litigation because the
exigencies of that type of litigation require that the attorney, albeit possessing an
important fiduciary dutY to her clients, must be given broad discretion in
directing and controlling the lawsuit. Under this theory, the decision not to pursue
a remedy vigorously could be a legitimate choice based on litigation strategy,
scarcity of resources, and/or a realistic acknowledgment of the difficulties
involved in implementation and thus the perceived futility of vigorous enforcement efforts.
In a similar fashion, Paul Tremblay argues that legal services decisionmaking
cannot be as client-centered as other litigation because of the problem of scarce
resources and the lawyer's duty to a "community of clients." 156 Because
professional ethies permit lawyers to turn away clients and public interest
lawyers often must establish a system for deciding what kind of cases to
accept, 157 Tremblay argues that the principles behind priority-based screening of
clients should be extended to aH of the other decisions that a public interest
lawyer must make in the course of litigation. Thus, when client needs and
community needs conftiet, the attorney, no matter what stage of the case, may
consider those latter needs in choosing litigation strategy, even in situations
where this means abandoning her client for the sake of another. 158
Under this approach, the diminished zeal in the implementation stage might be
justified as a strategie choice that the lawyer is entitled and required to make. The
nature of institutional reform is so distinct from traditional litigation, the
argument might go, that it justifies departure from general norms of practice. If
the lawyer thinks that her time will be more effectively spent pursuing a new
politieal goal, or serving a different community interest, then that lawyer is
ethieaHy justified in not zealously pursuing the remedy. Thus, a lawyer's
conviction that the symbolic power of setting a precedent in a partieular area of
law is more important than the speedy implementation of the remedy justifies her
choice of exercising less zeal on behalf of her client after the precedent is set.
But there is something wrong with this interpretation of Luban and Tremblay's
theories in partieular which points to the proper interpretation of the other
theories previously discussed. The premise of these theories is that public interest
impact litigation is a form of politieal action. The argument is based on the notion

155. Id. at 335.
156. Paul R. Tremblay, Toward A Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practices, 37 UCLA L. REv.
1101, 1103 (1990).
157. Both the Model Rules and the Model Code do not require that a lawyer take on any case. Moreover, the
Comment to Model Rule 1.2 specifically.allows lawyers to limi1 the types of cases handled by a legal aid agency.
MODEL RULES Rule 1.2; MODELCODE DR 7-101; Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 25, at 345 (discussing how bar
ethics opinions support the rights of public interest law groups to make intake decisions based on political as
weil as legal considerations).
158. Tremblay, supra note 156, at 1153.
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that in these types of cases, we have to move away from the exclusivity of the
attorney-client relationship and the undivided loyalty that it entails, and must see
the relationship as more malleable, encompassing not only client wishes, but also
the independent political judgments of the lawyer according to political exigencies. 159 Yet if we take Luban's political model and its implications seriously, and
we acknowledge that there are still sorne aspects of an attorney-client relationship intact (after all, Luban is talking about political action in the context of this
relationship), then our only conclusion can be that his model would require an all
out pursuit of implementation. Political action, as Luban acknowledges, is not an
abstract, theoretical undertaking, and political actors in particular aim for and
expect tangible results from their struggles. 160 Thus, on Luban's terms, lawyers
who fail to follow through on implementation have violated their duties as
political actors because, at least in many cases, they withdraw their commitment
just at the point where such commitment is needed to help to bring about actual
change. 161
Moreover, the hallmark of these non-traditional theories, and the concept that
they share with the traditional approaches to adversarial ethics as well as the
Model Code and the Model Rules, is that the lawyer must obtain client consent in
order to shape the litigation according to the lawyer's view of the ultimate
goal. 162 Both Luban and Tremblay emphasize the importance of informing the
client about the special nature of their legal relationship and the fact that if the
political aims of the attorney change, the client "might be left high and dry." 163
Luban states that "manipulation of a client on behalf of the cause is tolerable
when and only when the conditions of mutual political commitment" (freedom,
reciprocity, and equality) are met. l64 Taking this approach to avoid aggressive
advocacy in the implementation stage would require that the lawyer tell the client
that the aim of the litigation is a judicial articulation of rights and that even
"winning" the case may not bring about any actual change in the situation of the
client or those similarly situated if the lawyer subsequently decides that she does
not want to spend time pursuing the defendant's compliance with a court order or
settlement.

159. LUBAN, supra note 7, at 349.
160. Id. at chs. 13-14.
161. See generally supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussion cases in which partisan advocacy
had a positive impact on irnplementation).
162. MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(c) (stating that a lawyer may lirnit the objectives of the representation if the
client consents after consultation); MODEL CODE DR 7-IOI(A)(I) (stating that a lawyer shall not "[t]ail to seek
the lawful objectives ofhis client through reasonably available means").
163. LUBAN, supra note 7, at 318.
164. /d. at 337. This approach has been criticized as not squarely addressing the scope ofinforrned consent.
See Stephen Ellmann, Book Review Essay: Lawyeringfor Justice in a Flawed Demoeracy; Lawyers and Justice:
An Ethical Study, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 116, 180 (1990) (giving the exarnple where a client may agree to join a
poiitical movement but not fully understand or agree to the degree of manipulation to which she is subjecting
herself).
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This in tum raises the question of why anyone wouId give such consent. 165
This is different from a lawyer stating that she will only, for example, agree to
bring particular causes of action and will not ask for certain damages that she
thinks are unwarranted or unattainable. The difference is that in the latter case, the
client at least is assured that her lawyer will pursue the limited case zealously and
that if she wins, she can expect sorne compensation. It is hard to imagine why in
most cases, plaintiffs in need of housing, integrated schools, accessible workplaces or suitable medical attention would consent merely to the setting of
precedent. Moreover, because there may not be other lawyers available or willing
to take on large institutional reform cases, plaintiffs may be in a position where
any consent to limitations on representation is not the result of an informed and
free decision, but rather an agreement to take something over nothing. 166 Thus,
Luban's "dirty hands" approach and Tremblay's scarcity justification which
persuasively justify a less client-centered ethical responsibility of legal services
and public interest lawyers in the name of effective and efficient law reform,
leave off after the case is won.
This reveals the deeper issue involved in any question of ethical duties. Like aIl
questions of what is ethical given a variety of possible conduct in a situation is the
underlying question of what goals or principles are considered paramount. In the
context of the ethics of implementation, the question is whether the lawyer's role
is primarily to achieve a favorable ruling from the court and set precedent or to
bring about a change in the world and in the client's life. It is generally
acknowledged that institutional reform litigation is intended to bring about
change in public policy.167 The reason that critics have suggested that people tum
not to lawyers and courts but to govemment for this type of change is that they
realize that what these clients want is actual change in public institutions and that
the legal system is not equipped to implement public policy in large, public
institutions. 168
But, if lawyers are involved in this type of litigation, something must remain of
the basis of the lawyer's actions, that is, the lawyer-client relationship and the fact
that that relationship cannot be based on manipulation or deceit (even if we
accept Luban's notion that there may be sorne manipulation within the course of
the representation). Thus, under aIl of the theories discussed above, if the lawyer
does not intend to pursue implementation aggressively because she believes that
institutional reform litigation is valuable solely in its ability to set favorable
precedent, then she must inform her client of that view at the outset. The
overwhelming evidence is that lawyers are not approaching these cases in this
165. This question is closely tied to the problem of getting consent from a class. See Rhode, supra note 9, al 1212-15.
166. Cf Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 25, at 359 (discussing the problem of consent in the context of legal
services programs for indigents); MODEL RULES Rule 1.2 cmt. (1983) (providing that a lawyer cannot make a
client change her objectives to such an extent that Rule 1.1 is violated).
167. Chayes, supra note 2, at 1294-95.
168. HOROWITZ, supra note 150, atch. 7; LUBAN, supra note 7, at 309.
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manner, in part because they are not always aware at the outset what implementation will entail,169 and in part presumably because most clients wouId probably
not agree to this approach.

IV.

OBJECTIONS TO THE RECOGNmON OF A DUTY

At least three objections to the recognition of a particular ethical duty on the
part of lawyers to actively seek and monitor implementation are apparent. First,
because there is almost never an orderly progression from the court order through
the implementation, it would be difficult to evaluate the lawyer's behavior against
the end result of implementation. It is generally recognized that the final result
will never be exactly what was ordered or agreed to at the outset because of the
many variables that go into implementation and the unanticipated problems that
arise and have to be addressed individuaIly. 170 Even an evaluation of the progress
of implementation may be difficult as a lawyer may simply not be able to break
the intransigence of certain defendants. 171 This objection, however, fails for two
reasons. First, most of the ethics mIes in both the Model Code and the Model
Rules are open to the same objection. For example, Model Rule 1.1 is renowned
for its vagueness. l72 If easy evaluation were a necessary component to ethical
obligations, it would be almost impossible to articulate these obligations. In fact,
it may be in the very nature of ethics mIes that they are ambiguous. 173
Second, this objection looks to the wrong standard for evaluation. The
fulfillment of the ethical duty must be judged by the lawyer's actions in pursuing
implementation, not in the end result. In the event of a disciplinary proceeding or
malpractice action based on this duty, phone logs, time sheets, number of new
clients, as weIl as the progress of implementation and the attitude and compliance
efforts of the defendants, to name just a few elements, could be examined to see
whether the lawyer had spent sufficient time and energy on implementation. 174
Courts rnight also look at whether the attorney attempted to gain an understanding of the defendant's institution. 175 Numerous practical constraints, such as
169. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
170. See JEfFREY L. PiŒsSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION 143 (1973) (noting the variables
arising from the litigation that make implementation difficult).
171. See, e.g., Implementing Structural Injunctions: Getting a Remedy When Local Officiais Resist, 80 GEO.
L. J. 2227, 2249-50 (1992) (describing the intransigence of council members, for political reasons, to vote for·
legislation to carry out a federal district court's order to build desegregated housing in Yonkers); Kirp &
Babcock, supra note 4, at 374-75.
172. Wilkens, supra note 27, at 480-81.
173. See id. (arguing that alilegai mIes are ambiguous and the ethics mies are no exception).
174. See Harris, supra note 70, at 381-83 (noting that other relevant factors mighl include socio-historical
context and public attitudes in the media); Harris, supra note 79, at 191 (linding that the plaintiffs attorneys' use
of the media to publicize the defendants' failure to comply with court orders "played a very important role in
achieving compliance").
175. Sturm, supra note 82, at 43-44 (discussing how at the remedial stage of corrections litigation, effective
enforcement includes a lawyer understanding the institution's procedure and personnel).
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availability of adequate funds to achieve compliance, would influence any
evaluation of attorney conduct. Finally, a lawyer has sorne protection in the ethics
codes for the exercise of her professional judgment in making decisions about the
pursuit of implementation. For example, DR 7-lOl(B)(l) allows an attorney, in
the exercise of her professional judgment, to fail to assert a right or position of a
client. 176
Evaluation of an attorney's fulfillment of this dutYcould also depend in part on
whether there was a special master or other judicial assistant appointed to
monitor the remedy and the extent to which the court intended that that party
usurp sorne of the attorney's functions. 177 It may be that the involvement of
non-parties has the perceived effect of relieving plaintiffs' lawyers from participation. If the role of monitoring compliance is explicitly given to a third party, then
the lawyer rnight consider her role lirnited to traditional adversary procedures,
such as bringing actions for modification of the decree and contempt in the event
of noncompliance. That the appointment of a special master does not relieve
plaintiffs' attorneys of their implementation'duties, however, is generally recognized. 178 Plaintiffs' lawyers occupy a unique position vis-a-vis the implementation of remedial orders in institutional reform litigation because in such cases
"the scope of the violation deterrnines the nature and extent of the remedy." 179
The plaintiffs' lawyer developed the theory of rights that led to the court's order.
In developing a litigation strategy, the lawyer more than any other participant in
the litigation leams what the interests of the clients are and how the clients
envision relief. In fact, as one scholar has put it, one problem with the broad grant
of power to masters in implementation "is the realization that implicit in the
formulation of a remedial plan is the understanding of the wrong to be remedied.
When courts grant the institutional reform master great latitude in fashioning an
appropriate remedy, invariably the master's own concepts of constitutionally
acceptable conduct will color his recommendations." 180
This concern was echoed by the plaintiffs' attorneys in Collins v. Schoonfield,
who opposed the appointment of a third party to oversee compliance because
they believed it would take too long for a such a newcomer, not involved in the
issues at the pre-trial and trial stage, to become effective. 181
Moreover, masters and monitors, although often explicitly given the task of

176. MODELCODEDR 7-IOI(B)(I).
177. See Vincent M. Nathan, The Use ofMasters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10 TOLEDO L. REv. 419,
446 (1979) (stating thal if the attorney cannot or will not fulfill these duties, the master must, but Nathan is not
explicit about where the duty properly lies).
178. See. e.g., Halderman v. Pennburst State School and Hospital, 612 E2d 84, 112 (3d Ciro 1979).
179. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. l, 16 (1978).
180. Dobray, supra nOie 26, at 590; see alsa Harris, supra note 79, al 192 (noting that there is evidence that
masters themselves expect that attorneys will continue to communicate with their clients throughout the
compliance stage, and bring relevant complaints to the attention of the master).
181. 363 ESupp. 1152 (D. Md. 1973). See Harris, supra note 70, at 399.
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developing a remedial plan and monitoring its implementation, are delegates of
the judge, not the parties. 182 Judges recognize that by the use of masters, they can
"rninirnize [their] personal participation in the details of implementation without
sacrificing direct control or efficacy." 183 There is sorne concem, ai least in the
scholarly literature, that monitors and masters have increasingly been exercising
more power both as to fact gathering and as to fact determinations. l84 Courts tend
to accept these deterrninations without much oversight which has been seen as a
possible threat to the adversary system as weIl as to the Article III powers of
judges. 185 Sorne have gone so far as to argue that excessive delegation may
denigrate the legitimacy of federal judges:
Perhaps the most serious risk attending the use of an institutional reform master
is that sorne may perceive the master's relationship to the court as embodying
an inappropriate, even corrupt, delegation of judicial authority. Appointed in
the hope of securing an effective remedy, the master may insteadjeopardize the
court's legitimacy.186

Thus, recognition of a specific ethical obligation on plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue
compliance with court-ordered institutional remedies presents no more difficult a
task of evaluation than any other ethical duty. Moreover, the presence of other
compliance mechanisms may narrow, but should not elirninate, this duty.
The second objection to the recognition of the ethics of implementation is that
the last thing lawyers, or society, need is one more basis for malpractice actions
and discipline. The answer to this is simply that the duty, as has been discussed in
this Article, already exists in the context of "ordinary" litigation,187 as weIl as in
the ethical rules and probably in the rninds of most clients. As such, enforcing this
ethical duty would only entail the recognition of a duty that is aIready there.
Perhaps even more important is the fact that lawyers who do not explicitly agree
with their clients at the outset that they are only trying to set a precedent are not
doing for their clients what they were hired for and agreed to do. This is the most
basic form of unethical activity.188 On the other band, given the practical
considerations that work against enforcement of this duty, it rnight be argued that

182. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 (1996) (noting that a special master is appointed by the court and given specified
authority by that court); see also Donald Horowitz, Deereeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of
Public Institutions, 1993 DUKE L. J. 1265, 1274-1276 (discussing expansive powers of district courtjudges to
appoint masters to assist with implementation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 53).
183. Halderman v. Pennhursl State School and Hospital, 612 F.2d 84, III (3d Ciro 1979).
184. Dobray, supra note 26, at 591.
185. Id.; Kirp & Babcock, supra note 4, at 385.
186. Kirp & Babcock, supra note 4, at 323.
187. At least one court has reeognized a malpractice action against a lawyer where the client claimed the
lawyer was negligent in not collecting ajudgment. See DiPalma v. Seldman, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (showing a malpractice action can include a claim that the lawyer failed to colleet on a judgment,
provided the plaintiff can demonstrate that the judgment debtor was solvent).
188. The duty of competence is the first in both the Madel Rules and the Madel Code.
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there is no point in the duty's recognition. But lack of enforcement is endemic in
the realm of lawyers' ethical duties and is not a legitimate reason to do away with
standards, even if many of them remain aspirational in nature. As Rhode has put it:
Whatever the likelihood of enforcement, a collective affinnation of professionaI vaIues may have sorne effect simply by supplying, or removing, one
source of rationalization for dubious conduct. It becomes marginally easier to
justify the use of substantiaIly misleading evidence when the profession's
formaI norms decline to direct otherwise. Conversely, standards pitched at a
more demanding level can reinforce the lawyer who would prefer the ethicaI
course but is reluctant to appear sanctimonious. 189
In addition, aspirational mIes establish standards by which individuallawyers
can measure their own behavior, and peer groups can exert pressure. As another
commentator has stated:
The use of coercive sanctions is by no means the sole, or even the most
important means by which a profession uses a code to regulate the conduct of
its members. Most professions rely on both the 'internaI sanction of professional conscience' and the 'informai externaI sanction of peer criticism' to
promote compliance with professionaI norms. Codes can help articulate and
reinforce these norms as they are used during 'sociaIization into the professional subculture' and in rituaI and ceremonial occasions. 190
Finally, it might be objected that raising the ethical standards in a realm of
practice dominated by public interest and legal services lawyers would chill that
kind of practice. Public interest lawyers are aIready doing a public service and are
relied upon by the disadvantaged as their only access point to the legal system. 191
The other way to look at it, however, is that by recognizing these duties, lawyers
will improve the ultimate outcomes in institutional reform litigation, helping both
their clients in particular and the legitimacy of the process in general.
Moreover, this view of the obligations of legal services lawyers has already
been applied to legal services lawyers under their own professional code. The
Standards for Providers of Civil Legal Services to the Poor, approved by the
American Bar Association, impose a specific duty on legal services lawyers to
pursue the enforcement of remedies. Standard 5.3-6 and its commentary state:
WHEN A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT, SETILEMENT, OR ORDER IS OBTAINED, REASONABLE STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT
THE CLIENT RECEIVES THE BENEFIT THUS CONFERRED.

Effective representation of a client does not necessarily stop when a
favorable judgment or settlement is obtained. The lawyer should take reasonable steps to assure that the adversary complies with the order, judgment, or
189. Rhode, supra note 38, at 648.
190. Nancy Moore, The Usefulness ofEthies Codes, in 1989 ANNuAL SURVEY OF AMERtCAN LAw 7, 14 (1989).
191. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 24, at 399-400.
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settlement. Enforcement strategies should be part of long-range case planning
from the outset of any litigation....
. . . . If an order is obtained that involves a class of persons, the provider should
notify all affected persons and enforce compliance.
Occasionally, particularly in complex matters, enforcement of compliance
will become an extremely costly, long term endeavor that may be beyond the
resources of the provider to pursue. To the extent that such costs are predictable
the provider should by prior agreement at the onset of the representation
establish with the client an understanding of the limits on what the provider will
undertake on the client's behalf. (See Rule 1.2(c) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.) If otherwise consistent with the ethical duty owed to the
client, a practitioner may withdraw from representation, if the continued
representation will impose an unreasonable financial burden. (See Rule
1.l6(b)(5) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.) 192
Although the language is somewhat equivocal as to the scope of the duty to
pursue implementation, and employs the ModeZ RuZes to moderate the duty, there
is at least a clear recognition that such a dutYexists and that it must be considered
by the practitioner. Interestingly, in an earHer draft of the standards, there was a
more explicit recognition that the loss of interest in the case at this stage of the
litigation was a recurring problem:
Because litigation so naturally focuses the efforts of an advocate to win at trial
or to negotiate a favorable compromise, there is frequently a tendency to relax
aggressive efforts on behalf of clients when it appears that victory has been
achieved. Obtaining a favorable judgment or settlement, however, does not
necessarily mean that there will be willing compliance with that agreement or
order .... An advocate should be diligent, therefore, in assuring that orders,
judgments, and settlements are complied with. 193

IV.

CONCLUSION

It may be that lurking behind the failure of many of the remedies in
institutional reform litigation are plaintiffs' lawyers who lack the ability and
desire to seek implementation of institutional remedies. Unlike other analyses of
institutional reform litigation, which have driven sorne scholars to throw up their
hands and announce the ineffectiveness, if not positive harrn, resulting from this
type of litigation,194 this problem may be solvable, and in the solving may
elirninate other perceived difficulties with these types of cases. It may be that part
of the reason that institutional reform litigation often leads only to symbolic
victories is that there is not enough partisan involvement on the part of plaintiffs'

192. STANDARDS fOR PROVIDERS Of LEGAL SERVICES, supra noie 1, al 5.3-6 (citations omiued).
193. STANDARDS fOR PROVIDERS Of LEGAL SERVICES § 2.7-1 (Discussion Draft 1981).
194. See HOROWITZ, supra note 150; ROSENBERG, supra note 150.
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lawyers with implementation. 195
It must be noted that this Article does not assert that the ethical duty of
implementation is grounded in the practical goal of improving society through
institutional reform litigation. It is an empirical question whether this goal is
better served by spreading resources so that many cases get litigated and
precedent is set, but there is little left over to use for monitoring implementation
(arguably the situation now), or by litigating fewer cases and using more
resources tow~d implementation. 196 To state the issue perhaps more starkly than
reality warrants, in the former case, more cases are taken on, but many of the
clients end up disappointed by the lack of change in their lives, presumably the
very reason for becoming involved in the litigation to begin with. In the latter
situation, fewer individuais are heard in court, but those who are, and who win,
see real change in their lives. 197 As an empirical matter, we do not know whether
it is more effective to set legal precedent on the assumption that it will avoid other
litigation bycreating law in conformance with which other potential defendants
will subsequently change their behavior, or whether achieving implementation in
a smaller number of cases wouId demonstrate the success of such litigation to
potential defendants who would then have an incentive to change their behavior
on their own, knowing that if they are sued and lose, they will in fact have to
change. 198 It has recently been observed that institutional reform litigation in the
area of corrections is in the process of shifting from a "test case, law reform
model to an implementation model." 199 This is due in part to the fact that so
much legal precedent has already been set that attention now naturally turns to
the implementation of these new legal norms?OO This observati~n supports the
recognition of an ethical dutYof zeal at the implementation stage, as well as an
interpretation of the ethics codes which favors competence over caseload. 201
The dutY to pursue implementation, even in lieu of taking on new clients,
derives from the attorney-client relationship, the fundamental premise of which is
that the lawyer treat the client as an autonomous individual and help that client
195. This is suggested by one of the survey responses received by Tractenberg. That attorney was "sharply
critical of attorneys in school desegregation litigation for their failure to understand and deal effectively with the
remedial and compliance stages" of education reform litigation. Tractenberg, supra note 5, at428 n.31; Sturm,
The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, supra note 82, at 734 ("The regular presence of lawyers
raising questions can itself improve the quality of service delivery within an institution, and resolve sorne issues
without litigation. ").
196. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 25, at 380 (stating that it is neither likely nor necessarily desirable that
there will ever be enough lawyers to litigate and effectively implement ail of the potential cases that may exist).
197. See id. at453-62 (discussing the problems brought on by scarce resources in public interest practice and
the intractability of the dilemma between serving fewer clients more fully and serving more clients inadequately).
198. But see id. at 383 (suggesting that with increased enforcement of rules would come the shrinking of the
scope of those rules to maintain the existing balance of wealth and power in society).
199. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, supra note 82, at 707.
200. Id. at 711.
201. See supra note 96 and accompanying tex!.
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achieve her lawful goals.z°2 This premise is constant, although expressed in
varying ways and with varying emphasis throughout the literature on legal ethics.
The clients in these types of cases do not go to lawyers simply to win a lawsuit
but to bring about a change in their lives to which they believe they are entitled,
whether it be humane treatment in a prison, or an improved educational
environment. As Luban put it, "few people seek access to the legal system
because they crave legal vindication for its own sake; rather, they view recourse
.
to the law as a way to obtain something else of value to them. ,,203
No matter what one's view of a lawyer's dutYto take on a client or one's view
as to the appropriate remedy in these situations (subjects of an ongoing and
complicated debate 204), once a remedy has been chosen, its implementation, the
real "winning" of the case as far as the client is concerned, is well within the
attorney's purview. It is indisputable that in the context of traditional, civil
litigation, lawyers as a matter of dutYas well as routine turn to the collection of
the money judgment after a case is won. 205 There is no logical reason why it
should not extend to cases where injunctions are the remedy of choice. Understood in the context of the attorney-client relationship, the ethical dutYto pursue
implementation has a natural place.
Moreover, the ethics of implementation can also be seen as justified by the
lawyer's dutYto the court. The legitimacy of the court's order depends to a large
degree on its being effectively carried out. As Abram Chayes has stated: "In
practice, if not in words, the American legal tradition has always acknowledged
the importance of substantive results for the legitimacy and accountability of
judicial action.,,206 In fact, the crucial observation that unites all of the opponents
of court-ordered institutional change is that these remedies often are not carried
out or, if carried out, do not often achieve their intended effect.207 Although
.clearly there are instances where constant vigilance and active participation in
implementation would probably not make any difference in the final outcome,208
it is also evident that the ability of a court to get its order implemented effectively
would enhance the apparent legitimacy of the court's involvement in these types
of cases. Preserving the legitimacy of the judiciary is arguably one expression of
a lawyer's dutYas an officer of the court.209
202. Ali of the approaches to legaI ethics retain this in one fonn or another.
203. LUBAN, supra note 7, at 309.
204. Simon, supra note 7; Bell, supra note 9; Rhode, supra note 9; Freedman, supra note 4; HOROWITZ,
supra note 143.
205. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Cf ABAComm. on Ethics & ProfessionaI Responsibility, InfonnaI Op. 827 (1965). The dearth of case law and scholarly literature on this point, coupled with
anecdotal evidence that lawyers do in fact seek to collect their clients' judgments, is what makes this point
indisputable.
206. Chayes, supra note 2, at 1316.
207. ROSENBERG, supra note 150, at 31-32.
208. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
209. WOLPRAM,Supranote 132,at 17-18.
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To some- extent, this analysis has artificially set aside the very real problems
presented by the scarcity of lawyers, resources, and time endernic to public
interest practice in generafJO and the lengthy, drawn out, and complicated
process of implementation in particular. 2Il It is easy to say that a lawyer has an
ethical duty in regard to implementation but it is harder to deterrnine exactly how
to carry out that duty within the constraints of practice. But there are small steps
that can be taken toward the fulfillment of this duty. There is ample evidence that
plaintiffs' lawyers are not prepared for the difficulty encountered in implementation?I2 Arguably, it is unfair to impose an ethical duty on lawyers for something
that is beyond their competence. On the other hand, it has also been noted that
lawyers are capable of monitoring and when they do, compliance with orders
improves. 213 It may be less a question of lawyer's comp~tence than of the need
for lawyers to recognize and internalize a duty that arises naturally from the web
of duties already widely accepted by the profession. It may be incumbent upon
lawyers who bring institutional cases to think about the remedy ahead of time and
prepare themselves with a strategy for the effective monitoring of implementation. The current shift toward an implementation model of institutional reform
litigation, chronicled by Sturm in the corrections context,214 indicates that the
recognition of a duty to pursue implementation is a necessary, pragmatic
development. The next step is to develop standards by which to prescribe and
measure lawyers' performance at the implementation stage. The recognition of a
duty at this stage also makes judges more aware of a reciprocal responsibility to
pay closer attention to the plaintiffs' lawyer's activities at the implementation
stage.215 A lawyer's actual duty in any particular case may depend on a variety of
factors, including the extent to which one of the other enforcement mechanisms
represents the plaintiffs' interests and is willing to pursue those interests with the
defendant. 216 But the ethical duty of the lawyer must always be consistent with
the lawyer's "special responsibility for the quality of justice.,,217

210. Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 25.
211. Id. at 382-84. Bellow & Kettleson note that often plaintiffs who win in Iitigation are unable to reap the
benefits because of their the social and economic status. See id. at 383. Another problem is the "bum-out"
experienced by lawyers who do actively pursue implementation and therefore remain on a case for years after
the initia,l judgment has been reached. See Harris, supra note 70, at 397. See a/so CHRISTOPHER STONE, WHERE
THE LAW ENDS 27-69 (1975) (discussing the different effects certain sanctions have on organizations as opposed
to individuals).
212. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text; Sturm, The Legacy and Future ofCorrections Litigation,
supra note 82, at 713 ("Plaintiffs' lawyers frequently fail to recognize and account for the dynamics of running a
correctional institution in their remedial decrees.").
213. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
214. Sturm, The Legacy and Future ofCorrections Litigation, supra note 82, at 727.
215. Judges are already responsible for monitoring lawyers for plaintiff classes until the case is c1osed. See,
e.g., McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1\66 (l0th Ciro 1991); Foe V. Cuomo, 92 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Ciro 1989).
216. Nathan, supra note 177, at 446 (noting that as attorney activity and interest in the case decreases, the
court's reliance on the special master must increase).
217. MODEL RULES pmbl.

